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Doing Their Jobs:
An Argument for Greater Media Access
to Settlement Agreements
Suzanna M. Meyers*
INTRODUCTION
What do exploding pickup trucks, the Catholic priest sexual
abuse scandal, and police officers’ overtime compensation have in
common? These topics have captured the attention of both the
news media and the general public, and each has been the subject
of a confidential settlement agreement.1 It is not clear how many
settlement agreements contain confidentiality clauses, but many
believe that these clauses are ubiquitous.2

*

J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004. B.A., magna cum laude,
George Washington University, 2001. The author would like to thank the editorial staff
of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their hard
work preparing this Note for publication. The author also appreciates the guidance and
insight of Professor Abner Greene.
1
See Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A1 (“The Catholic Church scandals are one reason for a renewed
interest in the topic of secrecy in the courts, legal experts say.”); see also Phillips v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for the trial court to determine
whether there was good cause to seal settlement information related to explosions of fuel
tanks of General Motors trucks after the Los Angeles Times moved to intervene in order
to unseal); Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that the
interests of intervenors Landmark Communications, Inc. and Virginia Newspapers, Inc.
were stronger than the defendant city’s interests in confidentiality in its settlement with
police officers over back pay and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
2
See, e.g., Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows:
Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 676
(2001).
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There is natural conflict between the inclination of parties to
keep their disputes under wraps and the public’s desire for
information. The employment of confidentiality permits parties to
keep private the terms of their agreements, thus promoting
consensus among them.3 At the same time, journalists seek to
publicize the details of such agreements in order to fulfill their
roles as conduits of news to the public; the confidential deals may
pertain to safety hazards or spur further litigation.4 Adding to this
tension is the role that courts play as settlement facilitators.5
Courts often seal agreements and also have been known to
mandate settlement discussions.6
This Note will address the conflict that confidential settlements
cause between settling parties on one side and a press7 desiring to
inform the public of matters of interest, such as the workings of the
government, on the other side. It will propose a solution that
considers the often-sensitive characteristics of the cases as well as
the press’s and general public’s right of access.8
To fully comprehend the significance of confidential
settlements, one must first consider the changing landscape,
marked by an increasing number of settlement agreements with
secrecy provisions.9 Although individuals once debated the merits
of settlement itself, settlements are so entrenched today that the
dialogue is now dedicated to the secrecy aspects.10 As such, Part I
of this Note will discuss the roots of the confidentiality movement
3

See infra Part I.D.
See infra Part II.
5
See infra Part I.C.
6
See infra Part I.B.
7
The term “press” in this Note is used interchangeably with “media” and similar
terms, and does not refer specifically to print news sources.
8
For purposes of discussion, this Note will consider press access as synonymous with
a grant of access to the broader public. It should be noted, however, that the author
would advocate a view of access recognizing the press’s special function. See infra Part
III.
9
See infra Part I.
10
See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619 (1995) (arguing that settlements should promote public values in addition to those
of the private parties); see also Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and
Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991) (arguing that parties should
be able to formulate settlement agreements to meet their needs “with minimal intrusion
from outside forces”).
4
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and the arguments in favor of confidentiality clauses, the most
significant being the promotion of party autonomy and privacy. In
Part II, the discussion next will turn to press access rights and how
they apply to settlement agreements. The Supreme Court has
recognized the important function that the press plays as a
“surrogate” for the general populace,11 including the ability of the
press to inform individuals about events regarding which they
otherwise would lack information. The Court also has recognized
the parallel role of providing a check on government.12 These
press roles, discussed in Part II.A, create a strong rationale in favor
of greater access to settlement agreements. Although courts have
not encouraged disclosure of settlement information to either the
press or the greater public, Part II.B of this Note will explore
possible roots of access rights that include the First Amendment,
sunshine laws, court rules, the common law, and contractual flaws.
Part II.C will explore the manner in which courts have grappled
with these rights.
Finally, Part III of this Note will propose that the press should
receive greater access to settlement agreements, but that courts and
especially journalists themselves should use discretion to consider
party privacy. Litigation and court rules serve as the most
effective means to increase press access and can provide neutral
guidelines—before disputes arise—for disclosing. After such
guidelines develop, courts must apply them on case-by-case bases,
in accordance with legislative and judicial intent.
I. SOURCES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
It is first necessary to lay the groundwork for the debate. As
this Note will now recognize, the discussion has emerged with the
increase of the incidence of settlement and the accompanying
increase in court involvement. After acknowledging the trends,
this Note will show that the arguments in favor of confidentiality

11

See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980). Holding
that there is a right under the First Amendment to attend criminal trials, the Court made
the observation that the press often serves as a proxy for the public. See id. at 580.
12
See infra Part II.A.
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and the related case law focus on the privacy interests of individual
litigants.
A. The Role of Settlement
Settlement plays an increasingly dominant role in today’s
dispute-resolution landscape.13 Proponents of pre-trial settlements
provide various rationales, including a preference on the part of
legislatures and judges for alternative-dispute resolution,14 the
desire to ease caseload,15 the benefits when parties come to their
own solutions,16 and the “time-consuming nature” 17 of trials and
their cost.18 Those who oppose the trend toward settlement also
cite a litany of reasons: settlement does not create precedent;19 it
excludes relevant public values from the dispute;20 and it tips the
balance of power away from parties with fewer economic and legal
resources.21 Regardless, settlements are here to stay. The debate
over the pros and cons of settlement itself has given way to the

13

See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 26
(comparing the 10 percent of civil cases filed in 1970 that resulted in trial with the 2.2
percent filed in 2001).
14
See Samborn, supra note 13, at 26.
15
See Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 293 (1999) (“Settlement, it is
contended, conserves scarce judicial resources and relieves a court’s crowded dockets—
weighty objectives in a world characterized by too few judges, too many lawyers, and an
overflow of disputes.”).
16
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2673–75 (1995)
(discussing the benefits of settlement over litigation, including the ability of parties to
incorporate their individual values into the agreement, as opposed to the “all or nothing”
approach of litigation).
17
See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 2 (2000); see also Samborn, supra note 13, at 26.
18
See STONE, supra note 17, at 2; see also Samborn, supra note 13, at 26.
19
See Samborn, supra note 13, at 26 (“‘It doesn’t produce any publicly made law,’
says U.S. District Judge Sarah S. Vance of the Eastern District of Louisiana. ‘There is no
verdict, no appeal, no precedent.’”).
20
Luban, supra note 10, at 2634–35; see id.
21
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2667.
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debate over whether particular cases should be settled, and how
settlement should unfold.22
B. Court Involvement in Settlement
Press-access disputes often revolve around court involvement
in the settlement procedure. Such intervention may give rise to
enforcement of the First Amendment on behalf of press interests
based on the argument that court involvement is state action.23
Court-annexed alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) represents a
major area of such court involvement, emerging in the 1970s in
both optional and mandatory forms.24 Specifically, Congress
approved three court annexed arbitration programs in 1978 for
federal district courts.25 Since then, both state and federal courts
have employed ADR programs with regularity. Approximately
one quarter of the federal district courts and one half of all state
courts had implemented some type of arbitration program by
1998.26
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act
(“JIAJA”) established a general structure for the federal courtannexed arbitration program.27 As a result of the JIAJA, the
Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable to ADR, and there is no
requirement that arbitrators issue findings of fact or conclusions of
law.28 As such, arbitrators possess great discretionary power.29 If
a party to arbitration fails to request a trial within thirty days of a
22

See id. at 2664–65 (“For me, the question is not ‘for or against’ settlement (since
settlement has become the ‘norm’ for our system), but when, how, and under what
circumstances should cases be settled?” (footnote omitted)).
23
See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of state action.
24
See STONE, supra note 17, at 4.
25
See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique
of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2172 (1993).
26
See STONE, supra note 17, at 4. In addition, there were fifty-one district courts with
mediation programs, forty-eight with summary jury trial, and fourteen with early neutral
evaluation. See id.; see also Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 580 n.3 (1997) (defining
principal types of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), including arbitration,
mediation, and early neutral evaluation).
27
See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 2177.
28
Id. at 2178.
29
See generally id.
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decision, the conclusions bear the same force as a trial judgment
and cannot be appealed.30
Courts involve themselves in settlement disputes through
modes other than ADR as well. For example, courts issue
protective orders that bar the dissemination of settlement
information.31 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits such protective action;32 the rule mandates that the party
seeking to limit the flow of information show good cause for doing
so.33 Yet, because rule 26(c) applies to discovery, it lacks direct
relevance to ADR procedures. Still, it exemplifies the balance
courts must strike between confidentiality and the public’s desire
for information pertinent to court decision-making processes.34
Similarly, courts also may approve settlements, file them, dismiss
cases upon settlement, enforce settlements, or implement a
combination of these measures.35

30

Most districts also require the party requesting a trial to post bond for the arbitrator’s
fees and costs. See id. at 2183.
31
See, e.g., United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 854 (2d Cir.
1998) (upholding denial of newspaper’s motion to intervene in order to vacate a
protective order regarding a draft settlement agreement).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (authorizing courts to “make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense”).
33
See Dore, supra note 15, at 329–30 (“This entails establishing that the information
implicates a cognizable property or privacy interest entitled to protection and that
disclosure of such information would work a clearly defined and serious injury.”
(footnote omitted)).
34
See, e.g., Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 609 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“The
[c]ourt [finds] that the agreement is a public document because it is filed in [c]ourt and
because it requires [c]ourt scrutiny and approval for fairness. It should be accessible to
the public for review of the [c]ourt’s fairness in its decision-making, unless the reasons
for confidentiality outweigh the reasons for public access[,] which they do not.”).
35
See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to seal the record without
compelling reason, where sealing had been a condition of settlement). In addition to
sealing, the lower court in Brown also dismissed the case. See id.
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C. Case Law in Favor of Confidentiality: Focus on Encouraging
Settlement
The rationales for denying media and other public access to
settlement information involve the individual litigants’ interests36
and the promotion of settlement.37 The Second Circuit has cited
article III of the U.S. Constitution and its attendant disputeresolution authority to support the approval of confidentiality
clauses by federal judges in order to encourage “open discussion”
among parties and thereby foster settlement.38 An example of the
authority is City of Hartford v. Chase,39 in which Hartford settled a
dispute with developers working on a downtown construction
project and presented the settlement—which included a
confidentiality agreement—to the court.40 In turn, the court issued
an order that adopted the parties’ settlement agreement,41 and
despite the public’s interest in the city’s business, the Second
Circuit denied a newspaper and its reporter’s motion to intervene.42
Nevertheless, the court indicated that sealing should not transpire
“without a compelling reason, and interested parties should be
given an opportunity to challenge . . . .”43 The court also stressed
that the trial court, rather than the parties, should impose
confidentiality agreements.44
36

See Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (discussing the
interests of a minor who was a sexual-assault victim).
37
See, e.g., United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856 (2d Cir.
1998) (“In a perfect world, the public would be kept abreast of all developments in the
settlement discussions of lawsuits of public interest. In our world, such disclosure
would . . . result in no settlement discussions and no settlements.”). This case can be
partly discounted in the argument against access to settlement agreements because the
materials in question were draft settlement documents presented to the court as part of
ongoing negotiations, and did not constitute a final settlement. See id. at 855–56.
38
See id. at 856.
39
942 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1991).
40
See id. at 132.
41
See id.
42
See id. at 135–36.
43
Id. at 135.
44
See id. at 136 (“We do not, of course, by this decision, in any way mean to give
parties carte blanche either to seal documents related to a settlement agreement or to
withhold documents they deem so ‘related.’ Rather, the trial court—not the parties
themselves—should scrutinize every such agreement . . . and it is only after very careful,
particularized review by the court that a [c]onfidentiality [o]rder may be executed.”).
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D. Arguments in Favor of Confidentiality: Focus on Individual
Litigants
The interests of individual litigants dominate the arguments in
favor of confidentiality, and the case law reflects this reality. The
most prominent anti-access argument is that if parties lack
confidentiality assurances, they will hesitate to settle,45 and thereby
burden the “already oversubscribed judicial system” with trials.46
Even if parties settle without guarantees of confidentiality, they
may limit their disclosures because the public may screen
information related to the settlement process.47
Confidentiality also ensures the privacy of parties.48 Both
individuals49 and companies—the latter group sometimes
contending with simultaneous negotiations or suits50—have argued
that party privacy should not be sacrificed for transparency.
According to Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, plaintiffs in cases
involving “sexual harassment, defamation, and employment” are
also zealous advocates for privacy because they “have strong
interests in not publicizing the underlying facts of their
cases . . . .”51 The Supreme Court has held in favor of press rights,
45

See Dore, supra note 15, at 304.
See id.
47
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2685 (arguing that parties will be reluctant to
bring “nonlegally relevant” factors, such as emotional concerns and financial
information, to the table). This argument applies most directly to access to all settlement
information, not just the agreement itself. The information about the actual agreement,
while potentially damaging, is less likely to harm the parties than the aggregate
information leading to the settlement. That topic is not specifically addressed herein.
48
Indeed, such concerns have been cited as a rationale to keep records sealed even
when there is a so-called “sunshine law” in place. See Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d
499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (“Given the evidence presented . . . , the presumption of
openness and the public’s need to know do not outweigh the victim’s compelling interest
in maintaining his privacy[,] especially when considering the possibilities of irreparable
damage to the emotional and physical well-being of the minor.”). For a further
discussion of state sunshine laws, see infra Part II.B.2.
49
See id.
50
See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding
that, in a case in which the court-encouraged settlement occurred after trial began, the
court record should be open, despite defendant company’s concerns of harm to reputation
and the potential for the records to be used in another proceeding).
51
See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2684. Professor MenkelMeadow’s comment addresses a perception that defendants have the greatest privacy
interests to lose through disclosure. See id. at 2684.
46
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however, even in cases involving great privacy concerns.52 The
Supreme Court noted that “privacy concerns [may] give way when
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public
importance.”53
Finally, confidentiality proponents argue that the main role of
courts is to use the law to resolve private disputes without looking
to “extraneous” matters such as the general public interest.54
Secrecy advocates argue that any presumption of access resulting
from a connection between filing and courts’ adjudicatory role is
weak and easily rebutted by other considerations.55
E. How Common Is Confidentiality?
Because information is limited and anecdotal, it is difficult to
tell whether secrecy clauses are common in settlement
agreements.56 One insurance defense attorney noted that he had
not “put a settlement together in the past five to six years that
[lacked] a confidentiality clause.”57 Conversely, a Federal Judicial
Center study suggests that parties seek protective orders only in
five to ten percent of civil cases.58
Nevertheless, various bodies have promoted proposals that
would further secrecy. In August 2001, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Mediation Act (“UMA”).59 Although no state has adopted the

52

See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2000) (holding that the First
Amendment protects a radio commentator who broadcast an illegally intercepted cellular
telephone conversation); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (reversing, on
First Amendment grounds, a judgment against a newspaper that published the legally
obtained full name of a sexual-assault and robbery victim). In Bartnicki, although the
commentator did not participate in the illegal interception, he “had reason to know” it
was unlawful. 532 U.S. at 517–18.
53
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534.
54
See Miller, supra note 10, at 431.
55
See Dore, supra note 15, at 393–95.
56
See, e.g., Edward Felsenthal, Secret Accords in Civil Cases Are Under Fire, WALL
ST. J., June 26, 1996, at B1.
57
Fromm, supra note 2, at 676 (quoting California lawyer Glenn Gilsleider).
58
See Dore, supra note 15, at 301–02. This study only encompassed three federal
judicial districts and did not address settlements that were not filed in court. See id.
59
Reprinted in 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 165 (2002).
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UMA,60 its drafting and its approval signify a move toward more
confidentiality.
The UMA would encourage confidentiality
through a privilege covering the admissibility of mediation
communication during subsequent proceedings.61 Legislation of
this sort makes “an agreement that comes out of mediation as
confidential as the mediation process [itself].”62
II. SOURCES OF ACCESS
On the other side of the access equation, one finds the
constitutionally protected right of a free press. This part will begin
with a brief survey of the role of the press in America and the
origins of that role, and will follow with arguments in favor of
expanding press access.
A. The Role of the Press
Many scholars have argued that the press serves as a proxy for
the public.63 The Supreme Court agreed, stating that “[i]nstead of
acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by
word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it
chiefly through the print and electronic media.”64 Others assert
that the American press provides a check on government65 by
curbing governmental overstepping.66 This so-called libertarian

60

See Philip Recchia, Question of Uniformity Takes Center Stage at ADR Program,
STATE BAR NEWS, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 41.
61
See id.
62
Ellen Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides
with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 45 (2001).
63
See, e.g., JACK FULLER, NEWS VALUES: IDEAS FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 28 (1996)
(describing one role of the press as “surrogates who help the public discover and weigh
the evidence”).
64
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (holding that
there is a First Amendment right of public access to criminal trials).
65
See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 63, at 77–78.
66
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson, in a discussion of freedom of the press in his second
inaugural address, said that “to open the doors of truth, and to fortify the habit of testing
everything by reason, are the most effectual manacles we can rivet on the hands of our
successors to prevent their manacling the people with their own consent.” FRED S.
SIEBERT ET AL., FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 47 (1956).
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theory of the press traces its roots to the nation’s origins.67
Advocates of this theory argue that the press must be protected
from government interference.68 For example, in Justice Potter
Stewart’s famous speech, “Or of the Press,” he posited that the free
press guarantee of the First Amendment, as distinctive from the
guarantee of freedom of expression, was included to ensure a
check on the “three official branches” of government.69
Nearly fifty years ago, Professor Theodore Peterson proposed
that the “social responsibility theory” of press was modifying the
libertarian theory,70 incorporating a changing view of human
nature71 while responding to the consolidation of media interests
into fewer hands.72 The libertarian theory considers the press as a
check on government, but does not necessarily view the press as a
vehicle for truth.73 In contrast, under the social responsibility
theory, freedom of the press comes with a duty to reveal
information to the public.74 As such, journalists remain motivated
by a sense of responsibility to their audiences.75
The definition of a journalist’s audience can vary, however,
depending on context:
The New York Times may consider a vote in Congress on
free trade to be the most important story of the day while
the New York Daily News leads with a deadly fire in the

67

See id.
See id.
69
Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, Address at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial
Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 634 (1975).
70
See SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 67, at 73.
71
See id. at 99–100 (hypothesizing that the emerging trend was away from seeing
people as rational actors inclined to search for the truth, to seeing them as rational but
hesitant to use their reason).
72
See id. at 90 (“Editors and publishers are fond of saying that the growth of onenewspaper cities has been accompanied by an increased sense of duty to their
communities among the dailies which have survived.”).
73
See id. at 76–77 (explaining that, through press freedom, many ideas would be
revealed, both true and false, but citizens would ultimately discern truths).
74
See id. at 94 (“A free press is free from all compulsions, although not from all
pressures. It is free for achieving the goals defined by its ethical sense and by society’s
needs . . . .”).
75
See HELEN THOMAS, FRONT ROW AT THE WHITE HOUSE 14 (1999).
68
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Bronx. This is because of each newspaper’s understanding
of the community of readers it serves . . . .76
Conversely, longtime White House reporter Helen Thomas
stated in her memoirs that “It’s been said that the questions I
ask . . . are the kind that are on the mind of a ‘housewife from Des
Moines,’ and I hope that is true. To me, she personifies what the
nation wants to know . . . .”77
B. Foundations of Press Access78
This section will discuss various sources of press access,
including constitutional rights, statutes and rules, and contractual
flaws in secrecy agreements. These origins of press access should
be considered apart from the factual predicates to access, which
will be discussed in the context of case law.79Moreover, both the
origins of access and the predicates to access are distinguishable
from the theoretical arguments in favor of greater press access,
which will be discussed in this Note.80
1. The First Amendment
The obvious starting point for any discussion of a press right is
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Note will now
discuss the analysis such a claim must endure and the barriers to
success of a First Amendment-based access claim.
a) The Supreme Court Access Test
The U.S. Constitution provides one source of the right of the
news media to settlement information—although it has its
The Supreme Court has recognized a First
limitations.81
Amendment right of public access to criminal trials,82 but never
76

See FULLER, supra note 63, at 46.
THOMAS, supra note 75, at 100.
78
It should be noted that “access” in this Note refers to the ability to gather
information, as distinguished from the ability to print information once it is gathered.
79
See infra Part II.C.
80
See infra Part II.D.
81
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82
See Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
77
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explicitly has extended that right to civil trials.83 Moreover,
journalists have far greater difficulty accessing court proceedings
that precede a trial, even though the Supreme Court has granted
press access to preliminary hearings tied to criminal trials.84
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise
II”), the Supreme Court most clearly articulated when access rights
exist and when courts can abridge them.85 The Court articulated a
test that reviews “two complementary considerations”: whether
there is a “tradition of accessibility” or “whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question.”86 Once the right of access attaches, “the
proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on-the-record
findings are made, demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.’”87
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly extended the
First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings,88 it has
acknowledged a history of access,89 and lower courts actually have

83
See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) [hereinafter PressEnterprise I ]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (applying the
Richmond Newspapers standard in criminal contexts).
84
Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 7, 13–14 (1986) [hereinafter PressEnterprise II] (holding that the way preliminary hearings were held in California, “where
the preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale trial,” necessitated a right of
access that could only be outweighed by “higher values” when narrowly tailored to those
values); see also DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 426–29 (1999).
85
See generally Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 1. The case drew its standard from
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588–89, but applied it to a pre-trial proceeding, rather
than to the trial itself.
86
Id. at 7–9. Note that while the Court refers to these considerations in the context of
criminal proceedings, see id. at 8, this analysis is useful in discussing civil litigation and
settlement agreements as well.
87
Id. at 13–14 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510).
88
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558 (defining the “narrow question” at issue
as whether there is a guaranty of access to criminal trials).
89
See id. at 580 n.17 (“Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials
have been presumptively open.”). Note also that in his concurrence, Justice Stewart
wrote that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a
right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal.” Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
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recognized such a right.90 In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,
the Third Circuit found a common law and a constitutional right of
public access to civil trials based on the Press-Enterprise II test,
and consequently held that there must be an important
governmental interest in limiting public access and no less
restrictive alternatives to fulfill that interest.91 The Court also
noted “certain exceptions” to the presumption of openness: “The
party seeking the closure . . . bears the burden of showing that the
material is the kind of information that courts will protect and that
there is good cause for the order to issue.”92 Good cause requires a
showing of “a clearly defined and serious injury to the party
seeking closure” that would occur if closure were denied.93
Outside trials, journalists have even fewer rights of access,
despite the First Amendment. For example, the Supreme Court in
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart94 looked to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c) for guidance and specifically bypassed the First
Amendment in a question involving a protective order that
governed civil pre-trial discovery.95 The Court also has denied the
press any special access rights not bestowed upon the general
public.96

90

See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that, in a matter arising out of a corporate proxy fight, the district court should
have not denied the public, including two newspaper companies, access to portions of a
hearing and its transcripts).
91
See id. at 1070–71.
92
Id. (emphasis added).
93
Id. at 1071.
94
467 U.S. 20 (1984).
95
Id. at 37. Seattle Times is not on point for purposes of this discussion, as the issue
was whether the newspaper, a litigant in the matter, could disseminate information it had
already obtained through discovery. Still, the denial of a First Amendment claim is
relevant.
96
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 850 (1974). These cases dealt with press access to prisons, rather than to court
proceedings or settlement. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 852.
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b) State Action and Enforcement of Secrecy Agreements97
The possible incompatibility of private, but court-enforced,
secrecy agreements with the First Amendment presents another
source of support for press access rights.98 According to Professor
Alan E. Garfield, “[b]ecause enforcing a contract of silence
penalizes a party for the act of speaking, the logical question to ask
is whether this enforcement amounts to governmental suppression
of speech, thereby implicating the First Amendment.”99 The
Supreme Court has not recognized that enforcement of contract
law triggers First Amendment protections,100 but it has held that
tort law does.101 One possible explanation is that contract law
involves the consensual actions of the parties while tort cases arise
from nonconsensual actions defined by the government.102
The Court also has extended First Amendment press
protections to an area that appears to be closer to contract than to
tort, but which may be distinguishable. In Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co.,103 the Court held that enforcement of a promissory estoppel
claim was sufficient to constitute a state action and thereby
implicate the First Amendment.104
The Court’s language,
however, does not urge the view that there may be state action, and
thereby a First Amendment enforcement right, in contract law.
The majority opinion recognized that promissory estoppel “creates
97
This author assumes for purposes of discussion that confidentiality is contractually
based. This is true in the cases cited in this Note. The arguments for state action would
be stronger, however, if the confidentiality provisions were statutorily mandated or courtordered.
98
The speech interests directly implicated here are those of the parties to the
agreements. The ability of those people to disclose information, however, bears upon the
abilities of the press and the public to receive it.
99
Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 347 (1998).
100
See id. at 348.
101
See id.; see, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (using
First Amendment standards in the context of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
102
See Garfield, supra note 99, at 348.
103
501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991).
104
In Cohen, a campaign worker gave newspapers information regarding an opposing
candidate upon being promised by the newspapers that his identity would not be revealed.
See id. at 665. Cohen sued when both newspapers printed his name. See id. at 666; see
also PEMBER, supra note 84, at 358–61.
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obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties.”105 This
distinction between contract law and promissory estoppel could
lead to the conclusion that while enforcement of promissory
estoppel may constitute state action, enforcement of contract does
not.106 Another possible argument is that if the Court had focused
on whether state power is used in a speech-suppressive manner,
then the Court would not have limited its holding.107 For example,
Garfield opined that “[i]f the Court focused on this issue, it would
almost certainly find that state action is present in a contract of
silence action.”108
c) State Action and the Court’s Role in Settlement
Press rights also may extend from the right of citizens to
monitor the court system that they have entrusted to mete out
justice.109 Court-annexed ADR is a clear example of courts’
ability to handle individual disputes for the public’s benefit.110 In
fact, legislatures have enacted statutes requiring that certain types
of disputes, often defined by the amount in controversy, be
submitted to arbitration.111 Statutes like these may take the choice
105

Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668.
See Garfield, supra note 99, at 351.
107
See id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964)).
108
Id.
109
Cf. Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992). After
sustaining serious injuries in an explosion, Brown sued Amoco Chemical Company, the
parent company of the plant at which the explosion occurred. See id. at 1014. When the
parties settled, an important provision of the agreement was that the record of the case
would be sealed, and the district court accordingly sealed it. See id. Westlands Water
District moved to intervene because the information in the record was relevant to its own
suit against Amoco Chemical in an unrelated matter. See id. at 1014–15. The Eleventh
Circuit remanded upon finding that there was “nothing in the record to support the
sealing of the court file.” Id. at 1016.
110
See generally supra notes 23–36 and accompanying text.
111
See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 2177 (stating that, under the Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act, “[s]uits for predominantly money damages that fall below a
particular amount in controversy, which, depending on the district, ranges from $50,000
to $150,000 and do not involve federal constitutional claims or conspiracies to interfere
with civil rights, must be submitted to non-binding arbitration before a trial can be
requested”); see also Reuben, supra note 26, at 594 n.53 (referring to state statutes such
as California’s, which mandates pre-trial arbitration for all civil suits in which each
plaintiff’s claim is worth less than $50,000, as well as Hawaii’s, which requires
arbitration for personal-injury claims worth less than $150,000).
106

MEYERS FORMAT

3/31/2004 4:16 PM

2004] GREATER MEDIA ACCESS TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

619

of forum away from the parties to the dispute.112 Consequently,
unwilling parties are forced into ADR proceedings by the
government and may be subject to an arbitrator’s abuse of
power.113 Nevertheless, even mandatory ADR is non-binding,114
thereby diminishing the pro-access argument. Under the federal
programs, if a party requests a trial, an arbitrator’s record and
decision are nullified, a case resumes its original place on the
docket, and the record and the decision of the arbitration cannot be
introduced at trial.115
A comparison to a test derived from state-action cases in the
civil-rights context is useful as another means of evaluating the
argument that the press deserves access to settlement agreements
including those reached through ADR. In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,116 the defendant in a civil action used peremptory
challenges to remove potential jurors who were AfricanAmerican.117 The Supreme Court held that the state action
necessary for a civil-rights claim arose from that practice.118 The
Court applied a two-part test: “first whether the claimed
constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority, and second, whether
the private party charged with the deprivation could be described
in all fairness as a state actor.”119
The Court quickly dispensed with the first prong, finding that
the deprivation there arose from a system governed by a federal
peremptory challenge statute.120 Hypothetically applying the first
prong to the realm of court-annexed ADR, the alleged First
112

See Reuben, supra note 26, at 614.
See id. at 614–15 (hypothesizing about instances “such as where a neutral [arbitrator]
distorts the trial process by aggressively siding against one of the parties and encouraging
or intimidating it into disclosing sensitive information that may be privileged”).
114
See id. (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and its implications for
court-annexed ADR).
115
See Bernstein, supra note 25.
116
See 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
117
See id. at 617.
118
See id. at 628.
119
Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
120
See id. (“Peremptory challenges are permitted only when the government, by statute
or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of
persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury.”).
113
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Amendment deprivation would come from the parties’ use of the
courts and related mechanisms to solve their disputes. Analyzing
the second prong of the state-action test, the Court paid special
attention to the following factors: “[(1)] the extent to which the
actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, [(2)] whether
the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, and
[(3)] whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by
the incidents of governmental authority.”121 The Court found it
significant that, without government authority, the peremptory
challenge would not exist, let alone the entire system of jury
trials.122 Likewise, one could say that court-annexed ADR would
not exist without governmental authority, including the JIAJA123
and attendant court encouragement. Alternatively, one might
argue that the “actor” is the neutral entity, selected to resolve the
dispute, and resolution of disputes is a “traditional governmental
function.”124
Thus, it is possible to extend the analogy from the civil-rights
state-action cases to the grant of protective orders and their
subsequent sealing. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,125 a
predecessor case to Edmonson, the Court found that “private use of
the challenged state procedures with the help of state officials
constitutes state action.”126 In granting protective orders and
sealing settlements, courts also help private actors use
governmental procedures in a similar way. Of course, without
state action, the First Amendment and the Court’s access test in
Press-Enterprise II would not apply.
121

Id. at 621–22 (citations omitted).
See id. at 622.
123
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
124
See Reuben, supra note 32, at 621–22.
125
457 U.S. 922 (1982). In Lugar, a creditor sued a debtor, and also brought a
prejudgment attachment action against part of the debtor’s property. See id. at 925.
Based only upon the creditor’s ex parte petition, a court clerk issued a writ of attachment,
and the county sheriff executed it. See id. Using the same test later applied in Edmonson,
the Court found that there was state action. See id. at 939–42. The Court first stated that
the procedure through which Lugar’s property was seized was created by the state. See id.
at 941. Next, the Court determined that the creditor was a “willful participant” with the
state in attaching Lugar’s property under the state-created scheme. See id. at 941–42
(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
126
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 933.
122
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2. Pro-Access Statutes: Shedding “Sunshine” on Settlements
Pro-access regulations and statutes, including sunshine laws
that open certain court records, documents, and proceedings to the
public, provide yet another source for press access to confidential
settlement information.127 Ten states have enacted sunshine
statutes.128 Some, like Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a,129 are
quite broad. The Texas rule permits the sealing of court records
only if “a specific, serious and substantial interest . . . clearly
outweighs” both the presumption of openness that the rule
mandates and “any probable adverse effect that sealing will have
upon the general public health or safety.”130 The rule also requires
that the party seeking closure show that there are no less restrictive
means to “adequately and effectively protect the specific interest
asserted” before sealing.131 Under rule 76a, the term “court
records” includes “all documents of any nature filed in connection
with any matter before any civil court”132 as well as “settlement
agreements not filed of record, excluding all reference to any
monetary consideration, that seek to restrict disclosure of
information concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect
upon the general public health or safety, or the administration of
public office, or the operation of government.”133 By revealing the
contents of even non-filed settlement agreements, the sweeping
language of the Texas rule reaches more settlement information
than the First Amendment requires.
Still, Texas courts have not always applied rule 76a so broadly.
For example, in General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple,134 the Supreme Court
of Texas held that the lower court had abused its discretion in
determining that certain discovery materials were “court records”
127

See generally Fromm, supra note 2, at 682.
See id. at 682 n.86 (naming Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas and Washington as states with sunshine statutes).
129
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. (listing three specific exceptions not relevant to this Note’s discussion).
133
Id. (emphasis added). This list also includes discovery—”not filed of record” but
meeting the same qualifications as the settlement information—except as relating to trade
secrets and other “intangible property rights.” Id.
134
970 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1998).
128
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pursuant to rule 76a(2)(b).135 Although the materials in question
concerned tires returned to the manufacturer, and the issue was
whether a defect in the tire tread had caused the plaintiff’s
accident, the court determined that there was no evidence that the
information “could adversely affect public health and safety.”136
In another instance, the court did recognize the public interest, but
held that the privacy interests of the parties outweighed that
acknowledged public interest in disclosure.137
The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act also is worded broadly
and appears to provide significant access to information.138
According to the statute,
no court shall enter an order or judgment which has the
purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any
information concerning a public hazard, nor shall the court
enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect
of concealing any information which may be useful to
members of the public in protecting themselves from injury
which may result from the public hazard.139
The statute also voids as against public policy “[a]ny portion of
an agreement or contract” with the purpose or effect of concealing
information related to public hazards, as well as those portions of
agreements or contracts with “the purpose or effect of concealing
information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim or
action against the state, its agencies, or subdivisions or against any
municipality or constitutionally created body or commission.”140

135

Id. at 528. Kenneth Kepple sued the Ford Motor Company and General Tire, Inc., on
behalf of his son, who was seriously injured when the vehicle he was in rolled over. See
id. at 522. Kepple settled with General Tire, after which his attorneys moved on their
own behalf to vacate a protective order regarding confidential documents. See id. at 521.
136
Id. at 528.
137
See Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that the
privacy interests of a minor who had been sexually assaulted by a counselor with AIDS at
the psychiatric hospital where the minor was a patient outweighed the public’s need for
information).
138
See FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (2002).
139
Id.
140
Id.
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Furthermore, only those trade secrets “not pertinent to public
hazards” are exempt from disclosure.141
Yet, other state sunshine legislation is narrower. For example,
the North Carolina and Oregon statutes apply only to settlements
involving the government.142 Several states have failed to enact
proposed sunshine legislation, as has the federal government.143
3. Court Rules
Court rules provide another justification for press access to
settlement information. In the fall of 2002, South Carolina’s
federal trial judges adopted a rule banning all secret settlements.144
In its short life, this rule has generated much controversy. Citing
instances like the Enron scandal, Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson,
Jr. of the U.S. District Court of the District of South Carolina, a
proponent of the rule, wrote, “Here is a rare opportunity for our
court to do the right thing.”145 He also has stated that he was most
concerned about plaintiffs who were offered additional settlement
money in exchange for secrecy.146 Those opposed to the South
Carolina rule have cited concern about litigant privacy147 and a
decrease in the number of settlements that the rule may cause.148
Thus far, the South Carolina court rule is unique; only Michigan

141

Id.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3(b)(2) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402 (2003).
143
See Dore, supra note 15, at 311–12; Miller, supra note 10, at 429 n.7 (referring to
failed legislation in Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia,
and Washington. Note, however, that this information was current as of 1991.); see, e.g.,
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Legislators Look at New Sunshine
Amendment Draft, at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2003/0207sca1ca.html (Feb. 7, 2003)
(outlining a new proposal before the California legislature that was introduced in
December 2002, after a previous proposal had been defeated by one house).
144
See Kathleen L. Blaner, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Courts Deny Protection
for Confidential Information, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 1, 2003, at 12.
145
Liptak, supra note 1, at A1 (“Opponents of the [rule] argue that secrecy encourages
settlements, which they say are desirable given limited court resources.”).
146
See id.
147
See Blaner, supra note 144, at 12.
148
See Liptak, supra note 1, at A1.
142
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judges have enacted anything remotely similar.149 The Michigan
rule unseals all sealed settlement agreements two years after the
sealing date, “[a]bsent an order to the contrary.”150
4. Common Law Right of Access
The common law right of access to court filings151 supports
press access as well. The right is not absolute,152 however, and its
boundaries are uncertain. In Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., the Supreme Court noted that “access has been denied where
court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.”153
Broadcasters in Nixon were not given immediate access to copies
of audio recordings taken during Richard Nixon’s presidency, even
though the recordings were introduced into evidence in the trials of
others implicated in the Watergate scandal and the transcripts of
those recordings previously had been released.154 After noting that
“relatively few” lower court decisions had defined the common
law right of access,155 the Court recognized that the access right
required a balancing of the parties’ rights against the public interest
and the duties of courts.156
Other courts addressing the limits of the common law right of
access have held that the “strong presumption” may be outweighed

149

See E.D. MICH. R. 5.4, available at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/_localrules/civil/LR5_4.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
150
See id.
151
See Nixon v. Warner Comms., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
152
See id. at 598.
153
Id. The court goes on to name as an example a situation in which “records are . . .
‘used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal’ through the publication of ‘the
painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case.’” Id. (quoting In re Caswell,
18 R.I. 835, 836 (1893)).
154
See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 593, 610–11.
155
See id. at 598–99 (citing State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682
(1965)).
156
See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602. In determining that the common-law right of access did
not mandate release of the tapes, the Court ultimately did not engage in a pure weighing
of the parties’ opposing interests because Congress already had created a vehicle to
release the recordings to the public. See id. at 603 (outlining the duties of the
Administrator of General Services through the Presidential Recordings Act to review
Nixon’s tapes and preserve “those of historical value” and eventually give access to the
public).
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only by “sufficiently important countervailing interests.”157 The
obvious questions here, then, are what constitutes a countervailing
interest and what elevates it to sufficient importance. One
approach requires the court to look to the public’s interest in
education about the judicial system and at whether, as the Court
recognized, but did not specifically determine in Nixon, the
information would be used for improper purposes.158 Further,
courts have held that the common law right of access may not
apply when the information is filed under seal pursuant to a “valid
protective order.”159
5. Contractual Flaws in Private Secrecy Agreements160
Press access also may emanate from decisions of courts to
invalidate confidentiality agreements struck in instances when
parties lacked equal bargaining power, displayed an absence of
mutual assent, or lacked objective intent to make binding
contracts.161
Press access additionally can arise when
confidentiality contracts lack definiteness or when issues with the
statute of frauds arise.162 The press may benefit from a court’s
recognition that imbalances in bargaining power are compounded
when the weaker party lacks incentive to challenge a secrecy
provision because the secrecy will not cause that party direct
harm.163
157

See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the district court erred in denying the newspaper’s motion to
intervene because it did not base its decision on the balancing factors); accord United
States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995).
158
See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing
the balancing test but determining that a presumption of access would “undermine, and
possibly eviscerate” the court’s power when it has already issued a “valid protective
order”).
159
See id. (citing United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989)).
160
This subsection is not meant to provide a complete picture of the possible contractual
problems, but merely to give the reader an idea of the possibilities. For a far more
comprehensive look at the contractual issues, see Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil:
Settlement Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2002). See also Garfield, supra note 99, at 279.
161
See Garfield, supra note 99, at 279, 282–85.
162
See id.
163
See id. at 280 (“A plaintiff who accepts a generous settlement offer in a products
liability action has little incentive to challenge a confidentiality provision since he is

MEYERS FORMAT

626

3/31/2004 4:16 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:603

The preceding contractual concerns relate to formation, but a
court may also grant press access by voiding contractual terms
concerning confidentiality as against public policy.164 Section 78
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts would render a contract
term unenforceable if “the interest in its enforcement is clearly
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms.”165
C. Litigated Cases Pertaining to Access
Although there are a number of origins of press access to the
contents of confidential settlement agreements, access to
settlement agreements has varied according to several factors when
such matters have arisen before courts. Litigated access-related
cases generally fit into three categories: (1) those in which a court
has been involved in the settlement, (2) those in which the
government has been a party, and (3) those tried in jurisdictions
that have enacted sunshine or open-records legislation. As this
Note will now illustrate, access advocates have made their
arguments based on these factual predicates with varying degrees
of success.
1. Court Involvement
In cases that have yielded press access to confidential
agreements, court involvement has been the most prevalent
factor.166 Such cases range from those in which the court has
simply sealed the settlement167 to those in which a trial

already receiving compensation for his injury. People external to the contract—those
who either have been or will be harmed by the defendant’s products—bear the cost of his
silence.”).
164
See id. at 294 (“While freedom of contract might exist, there is no freedom to use
contracts to undermine important or . . . societal values.”).
165
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 78 (1981).
166
See generally e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2000); Pansy v. Borough
of Stroudsberg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994); Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d
1013 (11th Cir. 1992).
167
See Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (E.D. Va. 1999). The parties
submitted their settlement to the court according to the common law requirement that a
district court approve the terms of settlements pursuant to claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. See id.
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commenced before the parties settled.168 Courts have asserted that
members of the press have the right to monitor government
functioning,169 particularly in cases that have moved to trial.170 In
this vein, the Third Circuit named three specific values of public
access to court records: (1) “informed discussion of governmental
affairs by providing the public with [a] more complete
understanding of the judicial system,” (2) the “public perception of
fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view
of the proceedings,” and (3) a check on the judiciary to assure “that
the courts are fairly run and judges are honest.”171
2. Government as a Party
Several courts also decided in favor of access because the
government was a party to a dispute.172 Examples include a
168

See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that
“[t]his case actually went to trial, and, at least prior to the settlement agreement, the
transcript of that trial was part of the public record. The trial was an open public
proceeding. Moreover, and most significantly, the trial got as far as at least partial
consideration by the jury.”).
169
See, e.g., Boone, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (“[Public documents] should be accessible to
the public for review of the Court’s fairness in its decision-making . . . .”); Soc’y of Prof’l
Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (C.D. Utah 1987) (“In Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Justice Stevens noted that the core of the First Amendment
is access to information about the operation and functioning of government.”); see also
Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing other circuits’
decisions basing the presumption of openness on “the importance of preserving ‘the
public’s right to monitor the functioning of our courts’” (quoting In re Cont’l Illinois Sec.
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984))).
170
See Brown, 960 F.2d at 1016 (noting that “it is the rights of the public, an absent
third party, that are at stake”).
171
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339,
345 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) and
Crystal Grower’s Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980)). A concrete
contractor sued developers of an unfinished hotel and the bank that financed the project,
and sought to unseal settlement documents relating to a settlement between the bank and
the developer. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n, 800 F.2d at 341. In reversing
and remanding the district court’s denial of the contractor’s motion to unseal, the court
determined that the district court’s decision lacked particularized findings regarding the
need for continued confidentiality. See id. at 346. It is important to note that government
involvement in the resolution of the dispute also is often crucial to the argument that state
action is involved in the settlement.
172
See, e.g., Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Pub. Records v. Des Moines Register
& Tribune Co., 487 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1992) (recognizing, in a case
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municipal government as defendant in a civil rights action,173 a
public school as a defendant against in a case in which a
newspaper moved to intervene,174 and a government commission
that sued an employer in a collective-bargaining discrimination
action.175 Courts have acknowledged the public interest in
knowing what the government has done as a litigant in cases that
involve confidential settlement agreements and the use of public
monies to resolve disputes.176
3. Statutes
In cases implicating sunshine or right-to-know statutes, courts
have sided with press interests to further the public’s health and
safety177—particularly in cases involving products liability and
class actions.178 Still, courts have interpreted the public’s interest

involving a newspaper’s successful attempt to access information about the school
district’s settlement with a school administrator, that “[c]ourts have generally held that
settlement agreements with public bodies are subject to disclosure”); Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing a denial of a newspaper’s motion
to intervene in the settled civil-rights action of a former police officer against the
borough. “The public’s interest is particularly legitimate and important where, as in this
case, at least one of the parties to the action is a public entity or official.”). Two other
nuances of this case should be discussed briefly. First, the court did not make any
holding on the validity of the confidentiality order, but remanded the issue to the district
court. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 792. Second, the agreement at issue was not actually a court
record, having not been filed, but it was presented to the court for approval and the case
dismissed. See id. at 776.
173
See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 776.
174
See Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 994 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that denial of
newspaper’s motion to intervene was improper in a case involving a former employee’s
suit against a public community college, in which a settlement was reached following a
court-conducted settlement conference); Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 487
N.W.2d at 668.
175
See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 169
(9th Cir. 1990) (reversing and remanding for additional findings regarding the propriety
of granting a motion to seal the settlement).
176
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 487 N.W.2d at 669 (“[T]he outstanding
characteristic of the settlement agreement was the fact that public funds were being paid
to settle a private dispute.”).
177
See supra Part II.B.2 for discussion of sunshine legislation.
178
See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 75 S.W.3d 669, 675–76 (Tex. App.
2002) (upholding the trial court’s decision to unseal discovery documents under TEX. R.
CIV. P. 76a in a class-action suit).
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in settlement information narrowly179 and often have held that
litigants’ confidentiality interests outweigh the public interest in
access under such circumstances.180
D. Pro-Access Theories
Having discussed the possible origins of a press access right
and the factual predicates to access, this Note will now turn to
relevant policy-based arguments. These arguments have been
applied in the context of facts of individual cases, but should be
considered separately from the factual bases.
1. First Amendment Arguments
Perhaps the most logical, yet least successful strategy, to secure
broad access to settlement agreements has been the evocation of
the First Amendment and its attendant support for an unhindered
flow of information. In fact, First Amendment ideals have held
little weight in access cases involving settlement and other nontrial or pre-trial settings.181 This results directly from the Supreme
Court’s access test and its requirement that there be a history of
access to the government function in question.182 None of the proaccess cases discussed above was decided upon a First
Amendment rationale.183 The First Amendment would become
more forceful in this context, however, if courts concluded that
enforcement of settlement agreements involved state action.184
179

See Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that a fraudulent financing practice is not a “public hazard” under the
Florida sunshine statute because a “public hazard” is a physical harm or a “danger to
public health,” rather than a solely monetary injury).
180
See, e.g., Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that
the interests of a minor and his family in preventing harm that may result if information
about the settlement of a sexual assault claim outweigh the access claims of a reporter).
181
See, e.g., Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding
that the right of access for intervenor newspapers lies with the common law right, and not
with the First Amendment).
182
See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). For a complete discussion of the
Court’s First Amendment access requirements, see supra Part I.B.1.
183
See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800
F.2d 339, 342–43 (3d Cir. 1986); Boone, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
184
See supra Part II.B.1.c.
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2. Public Interest Arguments
Courts and commentators also have considered public interest
as a rationale for access—through two distinct lenses. First, some
have examined public interest as general community interest or
curiosity, but few judges or legal scholars have taken such an
argument seriously.185 Those who have considered the matter have
determined that general curiosity is not a sufficiently weighty
public interest, even though judges in other speech-related
contexts186 as well as in copyright law187 have hesitated to make
such value judgments.
On the other hand, a public interest argument based on public
health and safety has proven more amenable to courts. That is, the
public should have information because it would be dangerous or
harmful not to have it. Alternatively, if the information does not
find its way into the public consciousness, others who have been
harmed in the same way may be disadvantaged in their own
settlement negotiations and litigation with the party responsible for
the harm. In Wilson v. American Motors Corp., a plaintiff in a
wrongful-death suit against an automobile manufacturer sought
access to settlement information from a similar case against the
same company.188 The Eleventh Circuit discounted the defendant
automaker’s opposition to disclosure, which was grounded, in part,
on the company’s desire that the second plaintiff would not use the

185

See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168,
170 (9th Cir. 1990) (warning against “improper use of the material for scandalous or
libelous purposes”); Dore, supra note 15 and accompanying text (differentiating between
“idle public curiosity (an illegitimate concern)” and legitimate public interest).
186
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“For, while the particular
four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its
genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed, we
think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual.”).
187
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits.”).
188
See 759 F.2d 1568, 1569 (11th Cir. 1985).
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information.189 As such, the court allowed for the revelation of
information that encouraged “systematic efficiency.”190 In support
of courts—like the Eleventh Circuit—that have limited
confidentiality agreements for the sake of public interest, scholars
have asserted that private settlements “shield[] lawsuits from the
imposition of public values about important concerns, such as
discrimination in the workplace, price fixing or unsafe products”191
and represent a failure to inform the public adequately about
potential harms.192
3. Settlements in the Absence of Confidentiality
As case law has illustrated,193 parties must recognize that
simply bringing disputes to court—even if just for sealing or
approval—can yield greater press access. Courts have held that
once the dispute comes to court, it “is no longer solely the parties’
case, but also the public’s case.”194
4. Other Incentives to Settle
Finally, some argue that even if confidentiality were not an
option, parties still would settle.195 According to this view, the
costs in time and funding of a trial are so prohibitive that parties
would come to agreements in order to avoid further extension of
disputes.196

189

See id. at 1571 n.3 (“If formal proceedings occur in one court and are relevant to
issues being presented in another court, judicial economy would mandate their
availability.”). Note that the holding was based on the general principle of monitoring
courts. See id. at 1570.
190
See Dore, supra note 15, at 305 (“Arguments for increased public access, then, rest
on a vision of the judicial system that is broader than the individual lawsuit and that seeks
to import the values of adjudication into settlement.”).
191
See Samborn, supra note 13, at 26.
192
See FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (2002). The preceding discussion is not set forth to argue
that the press and public have an absolute right to information related to private
settlements. It is simply to suggest that public interest is one rationale among several,
i.e., monitoring government, that is an important consideration in the debate.
193
See supra Part I.C.
194
See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992).
195
See Dore, supra note 15, at 304–05.
196
See id.
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III. SOLUTION: INCREASED PRO-ACCESS COURT RULES AND
LIKE-MINDED LEGISLATION, EMPHASIZING DEFERENCE
TO PRESS INTERESTS
Thus far, this Note has considered the rationales for secret
settlement and the arguments in support of press access to
confidentiality agreements.
Clearly, there are compelling
arguments on both sides of the issue. This piece now seeks to
provide a feasible solution, with an eye toward an
acknowledgement of the press’s special role in the United States.
Effective judicial implementation of pro-access rules and
legislation, such as the South Carolina court rule and sunshine
statutes, provide the best answers. Determinations in individual
court cases often fail to yield principles of value to anyone other
than the litigating parties. Sunshine statutes, however, are
effective only if courts interpret them broadly and with access in
mind, rather than narrowing them into irrelevance. Clearly, caseby-case holdings will shape a relevant body of case law.197
Therefore, courts must consider a number of factors in each case,
such as whether the government is a party and the court’s role in a
given settlement, in order to yield a body of law that will allow
media members to fulfill one of their chief missions: monitoring of
the government.198
The purpose of journalism, however, goes beyond this
watchdog function. The press also supplies information about
dangers to the public and even information based on simple public
desire to know.199 Moreover, according to Professor Timothy Dyk,
“the press serves important interests that public presence promotes

197

See Dore, supra note 15, at 383 (suggesting that factors determining the legitimacy
of secrecy are whether the government is a party, if there are health and safety concerns
involved, and whether any of the parties are involved in similar litigation at the time); see
also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2695.
198
See SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 67, at 56 (discussing the “libertarian” theory of the
press, including the importance the “founders of the American system of government”
placed on journalism’s role in providing a “check on government”).
199
See FULLER, supra note 63, at 7 (noting that many journalists “take account of the
pull of basic (even base) human curiosity” as part of the determination of what is
newsworthy).
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only remotely, if at all.” 200 That is, news media serve as
surrogates to the public, whereas the public often has a more
limited and individualized interest in information.201 Dyk adds that
“the press performs an important (if controversial) ‘sifting’
function which the public cannot. The press often receives access
to information that is in part confidential, because by sifting the
non-confidential information from the confidential, the press is
able to funnel information to the public without sacrificing
secrecy.”202 Dyk cites not-for-attribution interviews, through
which the press receives information with the understanding that
reporters will keep secret certain facts.203 This is not a normal
occurrence in the settlement arena,204 but it could be a way for the
public to receive information through the press while not
compromising privacy interests.
As a result of this more expansive press role, one might argue
that a value exists in completely banning secrecy from settlements
so that media members can fulfill all aspects of their mandate.205
Yet, while the Supreme Court has endorsed certain protections for
the press that are broader than those granted to the general
public,206 the press has not received distinctive privileges for
newsgathering.207 For example, in both Pell v. Procunier and

200

Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 927, 935 (1992).
201
See id. (“For example, the public may wish to pass through a disaster scene simply to
travel from point A to point B, or even to satisfy individual curiosity. The press, on the
other hand, attends solely to report the event as a surrogate for the general public.”).
202
Id.
203
See id.
204
See Fromm, supra note 2, at 691–92 (noting the infrequency with which publishers
of settlement information publish confidential settlements, as well as the risk to attorneys
of leaking information where there is a confidentiality agreement).
205
See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 1 (reporting on and weighing the differing opinions
regarding the then-proposed South Carolina court rule banning all secret settlements).
206
See Dyk, supra note 200, at 927–28. These areas of special protection include
freedom from prior restraint and from compulsion to print material from people who
would express a particular view. See id. (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
207
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)); Dyk, supra note
200, at 928–29 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
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Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., the Court upheld regulations that
prevented journalists from interviewing prisoners.208
The Court’s jurisprudence is not entirely without language
indicating special protection may be appropriate at times.209 Even
in Pell, the Court stressed that the regulation was “not part of an
attempt by the state to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to
frustrate the press’[s] investigation and reporting of those
conditions.”210 Further, these cases came before Richmond
Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, which, while not recognizing a
special right of press access, does recognize the importance of such
access.211 Lower courts have also granted greater access rights
than the Supreme Court has.212 While not exactly a rousing
endorsement for unhindered press access to settlement agreements,
this recognition of the special role of the media is one among many
factors that support broader access.
Yet, as the adage goes, with great privilege comes great
responsibility. While this Note advocates for greater press access
to settlement agreements, it is important for the press to recognize
those interests on the pro-confidentiality side—particularly
privacy—and act accordingly. This is not intended to suggest that
media outlets should hamstring themselves or that the law should
hinder members of the press from legally gathering and reporting
information.213 But journalists, through such mechanisms as
newsroom policies and codes of ethics promulgated by
organizations like the Society of Professional Journalists,214 can
accomplish the purposes of informing and catering to public needs

208

See Pell, 417 U.S. 817, 831–32 (1974); Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
See Dyk, supra note 200, at 942–44.
210
417 U.S. at 830; see also Dyk, supra note 200, at 943.
211
448 U.S. at 572–73 (“Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand
observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly
through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of
functioning as surrogates for the public.”); see also Dyk, supra note 200, at 943.
212
See Dyk, supra note 200, at 944–53 (recognizing categories—not limited to the
settlement context or even to the entire dispute resolution process—in which lower courts
have supported greater access for the press).
213
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
214
See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS (Soc’y of Prof. Journalists), available at http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
209
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and desires for information while respecting the legitimate interests
of individuals in particular cases.
Journalists have successfully balanced the individual and
public interests in other contexts, and there is no reason to believe
this general success could not be replicated in the realm of
settlement information. For example, reporters gather information
through off-the-record interviews, keeping sources’ confidences
while learning foundational information for news stories.215
Historically, reporters have gone to great lengths to protect
confidential information216 rather than breach trusts.
Finally, the author of this Note does not suggest that the press’s
interests in disclosing information should eclipse the right of
parties to negotiate in private. Although increased openness would
be preferable, the practical reality is that complete disclosure is
virtually impossible, and mandating access in all cases infringes
upon the parties’ abilities to freely contract. On the other hand, the
media must continue their vigorous pursuit of information relevant
to the public’s well-being—particularly when parties choose not to
share it willingly.
CONCLUSION
“Governments want to keep things secret. I suppose it is their
job to keep some things secret,” said Seymour Hersch, the PulitzerPrize-winning journalist who exposed the My Lai massacre. “[I]t’s
my job to get it out.”217
215

Probably the best-known example of this phenomenon is the still-secret identity of
“Deep Throat,” the confidential source that Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein cultivated
for their reporting of the Watergate burglary in the Washington Post. See University of
Illinois, Department of Journalism, Finder’s Guide to Deep Throat, at http://www.comm.uiuc.edu/spike/deepthroat/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
216
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667–68 (1972). Branzburg, a
newspaper reporter, was twice ordered to appear before grand juries based on stories he
had reported on drug-related activity. See id. at 668–70. The first time, he appeared but
refused to disclose the identities of individuals illegally possessing marijuana and
making hashish in a picture accompanying his story. See id. at 667–68. In the second
instance, Branzburg moved to quash the summons. See id. at 669–70.
217
ABRAHAM S. CHANIN, THE FLAMES OF FREEDOM 109 (1990) (quoting Pulitzer Prizewinning journalist Seymour Hersch).
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As Hersch has suggested, both the government and private
parties “want to keep things secret.”218 Legislatures should
determine what is in the public interest, and the courts should be
mindful of the press’s ability to put sunshine statutes to use, as
legislatures intended when crafting them. Further, courts should
adopt rules like those in South Carolina in order to make clear that
parties cannot buy secrecy. Such provisions will allow journalists
to continue to do their jobs, and the public to reap the benefits.

218

Id.

